(theme music plays) GRAHAM: Welcome to "P&P Live".
I'm Brad Graham, the co-owner of Politics and Prose, along with my wife, Lissa Muscatine, and we have a very revealing program for you this evening about China's brutal suppression of the Uyghurs.
Journalist Geoffrey Cain is here to talk with another journalist Ishaan Tharoor about Geoffrey's new book, "A Perfect Police State: An Undercover Odyssey Into China's Terrifying Dystopia of the Future".
His first book "Samsung Rising", which came out last year, was an expose of South Korea's most valuable company.
In "The Perfect Police State", Geoff takes on an even more ambitious subject, China's extensive and alarming efforts to repress the Uyghur people, and other ethnic and religious minorities in Xinjiang Province.
It's a systematic campaign overseen by government leaders, and powered by such cutting-edge tech-technologies as facial recognition, DNA tracking and artificial intelligence.
Geoff will be in conversation, uh, with, uh, Ishaan who's a columnist on the, er, foreign desk of "The Washington Post", where he anchors the papers weekday newsletter called "Today's WorldView".
Previously, Ishaan was a senior edtor and correspondent at Time Magazine based first in Hong Kong and later in New York.
So Geoff and Ishaan, the screen is yours.
THAROOR: Thank you so much Brad, and thank you to Politics and Prose.
I'm really grateful, uh, to be able to moderate this conversation with Geoff.
The last time that we saw each other was in, er, oh, a beautiful night market in Seoul, where Geoff took me out to an incredible dinner, and then, and then time has gone by.
This is probably 12 years ago.
So-so it's good to see you.
It's great to be here.
Uh, lets-let's get into the meet of-of, uh, of the book.
Uh... CAIN: Great.
THAROOR: Xinjiang of course is a, er, a part of the world that, uh, we in the United States, and elsewhere in the West are coming to learn about, uh, for all the wrong reasons, um, more and more in recent years, uh, that's because of course, er, of the, what you write about, which is this-this post-modern surveillance state that China has constructed around Xinjiang's ethnic minorities in the far west of the country.
And-and of course, uh, com-uh, combined with a really systematic and comprehensive, uh, campaign of repression, uh, that has, uh, been likened to ethnic cleansing and genocide even by, uh, some UN repertoires.
Er, so, I guess, the way to kickoff this conversation, er, hey Geoff is, you know, there as been a lot of, uh, journalism done about Xinjiang.
Uh, there is, we're starting to kinda scratch at the surface of-of this story, which is one that's of course shrouded in layers of opacity because of the controls, and-and-and-and, uh, prohibitions of the Chinese state.
Uh, your book, I would say, right off the bat, is a tremendous contribution to this.
Er, it-it really is, I-I would recommend for anybody, uh, who wants to get a sense of the scope and scale of what's happening, er, in-in China, and specifically in Xinjiang, uh, er, er, it's a, it's a tremendous, uh, sort of contribution to our understanding of that, as well as what it means in a more global frame.
So Geoff could you talk us through an, uh, sort of the-the-the work that surrounded creating, er, writing this book and reporting this book, you know, which was no mean feat.
and, er, and-and also, uh, give us a sense of-of kind of the-the broader thrust of your thesis as well?
CAIN: Writing this book, um, you know, it was no small feat.
you know, I-I started researching the topic in 2016 and '17, when, um, the repression in Xinjiang was just starting to get, uh, worse.
I had spent a lot of chime-time in China already, and, um, I had heard, I had many Uyghur friends around the region, around Asia, in-in Thailand, and Korea and, you know, other countries where they could speak a little more freely, and, um, you know, we would get lunch, and they would tell me about how, uh, you know, a member of their family has disappeared, or-or, you know, a, um, a brother, a cousin, uh, you know, is being harassed by the authorities, you know, and-and this was actually, at first, um, it wasn't surprising, because the Uyghur ethnic group in China has-has historically been, um, repressed.
But, I was alarmed as more time passed because, um, the reports I was hearing, and, uh, the level of sophistication of the surveillance that was being constructed, um, in this region, you know, hearing it from first-hand refugees who had recently left, um, eh, it-it struck me as something that, you know, it-it was something that overtime I realized that the world might not have actually seen anything quite like this, because, um, I was hearing more and more stories, um, from my own postings about the use of artificial intelligence, about, um, you know, smartphone technologies, about the-the police getting, uh, bumps or nudges from, um, various apps that would, um, you know, warn them that somebody might commit a crime in the future, that the-the computer systems have figured out, uh, you know, this-this pre-crime system similar to the film and the short story "Minority Report".
Um, these sorts of stories, um, were building up overtime, and I had been, you know, traveling to the region.
I-I spent some time in Kashgar, um, and Ürümqi, which are two of the major urban centers, um, er, yeah and I also documented, you know, traveling back and forth to the region.
The-the most recent time I was there was December 2017.
Um, overtime just, you know, how much more, um, intense and sophisticated that surveillance, uh, was getting.
So, in my beat, as a reporter, um, I was always something of a-a guy who wrote about this intersection of authoritarian regimes and technology.
I had, you know, gotten my star-start, uh, covering the Cambodian genocide tribunal many years ago, diving into the psychology of some of these, uh, mass murderers and spent time in North Korea, um, you know, in Russia, Turkey, other authoritarian regime's kind of studying, um, how these regimes were starting to deploy some of these new technologies, and in all of my years of covering this topic, I just, I saw that, um, what was happening in Western China, uh, was going to be big, and it was something that the world needed to hear about, um, not just because of the atrocities against the Uyghur and the Kazakh, and other Muslim minorities there, um, but because this has deep foreboding significance, um, for humanity at-large, you know?
I think that, um, there are many authoritarian governments and repressive governments that are eagerler-eagerly looking for ways to adapt these same tac-tactics.
Um, we are now seeing the, uh, largest internment of ethnic minorities since The Holocaust, happening in China, um, to these Muslim minorities.
There are about 1.8, uh, 1.8 million people who are currently being detained, uh, without trial, without a criminal charge in a network of hundreds, and maybe even in the low thousands of-of concentration camps scattered, um, throughout the region, and in these concentration camps, uh, you know, they undergo brainwashing indoctrination, um, various forms of psychological and physical torture, um, and-and essentially the result is that the Chinese state is-is-is attempting to, um, erase the identity and the-the heritage and the history of an entire people, to-to eradicate the soul of-of, um, how people see themselves and to, you know, you know, I guess you could say, "Erase their mind of what they call ideological viruses," this is what the Chinese state uses to describe it, and then, you know, replace these-these empty souls whose-whose identities have been erased with Chinese government propaganda, communist propaganda and various, you know, authoritarian, um, personality cultish propaganda.
Um, so, it truly is, er, a significant moment, I think, in our history.
I think that, um, uh, you know, I-I do speculate a little bit, but I do think that when historians, um, look back at some of the 21st century atrocities, um, that are unfolding now, I think that Xinjiang will be one of the, um, major tipping points, or one of the starting points, you know, one of the-the big, it-it'll, I-I guess, it may be similar to how in the early 20th century there was, uh, you know, the-the Ottoman, uh, genocide of, um, you know, of minority groups, um, that sort of laid the stage for some of the, you know, the atrocities that happened later, and I think that Xinjiang might play a similar role in which, uh, we now see the sinister ways that technology can be deployed to oppress and surveil, um, and essentially erase the identities of an entire population.
THAROOR: I-I think it's important to convey to the audience, uh, uh, the risk involved in-in some of the work you were doing, uh, less to you than to the sources and to the people that you were speaking with.
Um, and you've taken quite significant, uh, steps to try and protect, um, protect them in your reporting, and in your writing.
Er, could you give us a sense of something, you know, you spoke to dozens of people for this book, could you give us a sense of some of the characters involved, some of the stories of, that-that they told you of the experiences they had, um, and-and of course, uh, the-the Big Brother dystopian state surrounding them, uh, and how they navigated that to talk to you?
CAIN: Yes, so there was enormous risk involved, and, um, er, my publisher and I took enormous, took whatever steps we could, I mean, consulted cyber security experts, um, you know, physical security experts to protect, uh, the sources, because, um, there were significant risks that they took in participating, you know, in-in the interviews, um, of this book.
So, my-my key protagonist who I found, um, I, so I had actually just left Kashgar in Western China and, um, I had moved to Turkey for-for about three years to spend time among the refugee population there.
Turkey is home to the-the biggest diaspora of Uyghur, um, and other minority groups from China, er, you know, Muslim minority groups.
They-they do go to Turkey, because they-they share a fellow, um, Turkic, uh, uh, you know, (inaudible) in cultural practices.
And so, um, I was traveling with my, um, my Uyghur, um, assistant.
I-I had a partner named, uh, Abduelli, you know, we collaborated deeply on this book, and he told me one day, um, that there was a young woman who had, yeah, who was one of the first to escape the camps, um, in a rather miraculous, um, escape.
I mean, it was just, er, it was amazing that she got out the way she did, and she had, uh, managed to arrive in Turkey, um, you know, as a student, because she had a-a student visa already, and she-she was, you know, she was recovering from the immense psychological effects.
She was, you know, going back and repiecing, you know, trying to figure out what just happened to her, and she wanted to open up and start talking about it, you know, with a journalist to-to tell her story, um, you know, to-to get some kind of record out there, so that, you know, just to contribute to, uh, the world awareness of what's going on.
So, this woman's name was Maysem, uh, so this is a pseudonym, it's not her real name.
Um, we, she still has family there, and we took, uh, we had to remove lots of details just to protect her family in the region.
Um, a very bright, very intellectual young woman who, um, came from a family and a tradition of literature and poetry, um, you know, who loved to read from a young age, uh, had a mother, had a grandfather who-who encouraged, uh, these, um, you know, the-these literary pursuits.
Uh, she could read, I mean, she was reading everything from ancient, uh, Persian epics, Greek epics, um, and poetry to, um, you know, more recent works like Jane Austin, er, you know, and then even going mo-further, I mean, she would read people like, yeah, Joseph Nye and, you know, modern political scientists, so, um, someone who just had, uh, a major, um, just, er, er, a very, um, diverse world view, um, who loved to explore different cultures, who-who grew up and graduated, uh, near the top of her class, uh, near the top of the entire region actually, um, gained entry to an elite university in Beijing and she was, uh, planning and at least it appeared that coming from a family that was trusted by the party and having such a, uh, a great background, she was being tapped to become a diplomat.
She was gonna be one of the few Uyghurs to go overseas and serve her country, and party.
Um, she was also a devout communist for a long time.
Um, so, er, er, you know, she, um, as she entered school, she started to realize, I guess, like many, uh, you know, young idealistic university students do, some of the injustices that-that were happening, uh, in China, to various groups, various religious and ethnic groups, and she came face-to-face, you know, with-with her first major experiences of discrimination in-in Beijing, people called her, you know, a-um, you know, she was, she was Muslim, they-they laughed at her veil, they, um, you know, they told her she was a foreigner, she was not a real Chinese, and, you know, she became disillusioned with the way that the nation as-as she saw it was headed, and she saw much more, um, you know, China was emerging and there was this underbelly of xenophobia, racism, um, you know, just national pride that meant that the Uyghurs had to be like kinda smeared as this-this out, this outside enemy, the other.
And so she decided after graduating to, uh, head to Turkey, um, where she would do a master's and hopefully a PhD, which remains unfinished in international relations.
Um, she decided to take the academic route more, and this was around the time when there were a number of, uh, terrorist attacks in China, and also protests, uh, around 2000 in 2009, um, so there was a major uprising of, uh, Uyghur protests in-in the West.
Um, so the Chinese government was starting to crack down more and more, you know, as time went on.
And so, um, Maysem had a very interesting view of what was happening in the region, because she would return every summer from Turkey, from her master's degree studies, and, you know, sh-every summer she would see more police pillboxes, you know, more surveillance, um, more monitoring of apps such as WeChat, a major Chinese messaging app.
Um, you know, she would see more restrictions in place kind of, you know, happening, um, happening slowly for the people who lived there, but-but as a result of her being on the outside, she could see in a more dramatic fashion just, you know, how things were getting worse and worse, to the point where people did not, um, trust each other like they used to.
I think that the-the-the state surveillance apparatus had found ways to divide and conquer, to turn neighbors against neighbors.
People were, um, you know, they were encouraged to spy and snitch on each other, and they had neighborhood watch programs, and of course the goal of-of all, of all of this was to root out, um, you know, potential terrorists who were supposedly hiding in the population though, you know, that-that was a imagined enemy.
Um, so, um, things really started getting bad in 2016 when, uh, Maysem came home for the summer, and, uh, she, yeah, so, uh, a government official, uh, knocked on her door and, you know, said, essentially said that because she had been studying in Turkey, uh, because she had this propensity for, you know, reading so many books for, you know, having this-this vivid imagination that her neighbors talked about, um, that she was considered suspicious, and that she had to install a-a government camera in her living room that would linkup to the, to the police station, so they could, you know, monitor her and her family.
And Turkey of course is one of the sensitive countries, uh, that-that China consider is sensitive, um, and so after they installed this camera, um, er, so, you know, as the situation got worse and worse, she was actually, um, you know, summoned one day, just arbitrarily for no clear reason, um, first to undergo, um, interrogation sessions every-every weekend she would have to check-in at the police station and three, you know, three officers would stand there, er, er, at a table, um, you know, and they would just ask her questions over and over, just mind-boggling questions, "What did you do this morning, what did you do, why did you come in through the backdoor yesterday, why," you know, like, "Do you read the Koran, do you, like-like why are you studying in Turkey?"
Um, and, you know, she thought this was as bad as it was gonna get, until one day she was summoned, uh, to the local government office, um, and then taken away, uh, in a car, um, to one of the first known, uh, reeducation camps or reeducation camps in Kashgar, um, this was in September 2016 when these programs started taking off, uh, and she was taken to this, so then she was taken to this indoctrination class and she would, she was told that she would be allowed to go home, but then, um, within hours of arri-of arriving at this one center, uh, she was ordered, er, she was transferred to another center that was even bigger, even worse, um, and this would be called a detention center, uh, you know, by-by the Chinese authorities.
And, so, and so she was put in this detention center, and, um, this was the place where, I mean, she was forced, um, to confine herself, she-she was, uh, put in a small cell, uh, about the size of a living room, you know, she-she was there with about 22 dozen, um, you know, fellow female inmates.
You know, they didn't have a bathroom available, like they would have to, um, you know, urinate in a bucket and, you know, this, these are terrible conditions, but, um, you know, that, I mean, like for a-a Chinese detention center like that, you know, like that might sound actually kind of normal, but what was, what really shocked her, um, was the extent of the psychological torture that went on, and, you know, just the ways that the Chinese state, you know, would-would just essentially, um, erase the identities of people there.
She would describe them as, um, you know, people who had recovered from a car crash and just simply it's like they-they lost their memory and, you know, you look at them, and there's just no emotion and there's like, you know, there's always a flat face and you know they-they speak little, they say little, um, the inmates, you know, they-they don't smile, they don't frown, they don't, you know, laugh, they don't cry.
It was if sh-she felt that she had been put in just this dystopian world by this artificial intelligence system that was constantly monitoring her, and, you know, she being, um, this intelligent reader, you know, she had read 1984, and she realized, um, you know, that she was living now in George Orwell's prophecy, you know, that she was actually living in that world that, you know, she assumed it was like this old, you know, British, this Englishman from the 1940s writing about, uh, you know, commenting on Soviet Union and Fascism and all this, but she realized that, you know, like whatever-whatever had happened in the past, um, was just simply nothing compared to what was happening now.
And so, through, um, a series of just bureaucratic, uh, you know, um, er, this was a, er, so, this police state is extremely bureaucratic, and they do bungle they-they don't know everything, the systems are not as powerful as, you know, she found as they make it out to be, but that was what was the strength was because it makes people uncertain about what's gonna happen to them, and she managed, she and her family have managed to, uh, use some of these weaknesses to exploit some of the holes in the bureaucratic system to, um, you know, in just a miracle, a very lucky miracle, like she-she was able to get out, um, after about a week.
Uh, her mother helped her the whole way through, and she would have been one of the last, uh, Uyghurs to escape one of the camps, um, before the government began seizing passports.
So, through the help of many brave, um, people working on a kind of underground railroad that used to exist over there, um, she was able to escape.
She got a-a bus ticket out, uh, and she was able to return to Turkey, to return to, um, you know, her boyfriend to-to marry him, um, to-to finish her studies, but only after overcoming, er, the enormous, uh, psychological burden of what it was like, you know, to-to just ch-just to be brainwashed every day to be, um, you know, to undergo all these, um, you know, these exercises where you're forced to deny your reality, your senses and everything that exists around you.
Once she recovered from that, you know, in Turkey, then she felt that she was truly free, and she had liberated her mind from, you know, the prison that the state had tried to keep her in.
You know, there was another protagonist who, um, was a former Chinese spy who, um, you know, we-we were very, I was very worried about him, because after I interviewed him, um, and he w-he was going on TV broadcast to tell a story.
He was a defector who had spied on-on Uyghurs originally, um, and he was shot twice in the back one day in Istanbul.
He was leaving his friend's apartment, uh, and a gunman who was probably, you know, a hired assassin by Chinese intelligence, or somewhere, um, just walked up behind him, shot him twice in the back of the shoulder.
Uh, he was very lucky to survive.
He-he has been hospitalized.
I-I've been in touch with him.
He's, um, you know, recovering, but, you know, has been nearly paralyzed, but it seems like he'll be able to walk again.
It's a miracle that, you know, this, um, that-that, like it's just, you know, reporting the story is just a miracle, just seeing, um, what the Uyghurs have been through, just the terrible suffering and just, you know, the threats that they face, and the-the physical violence even when they're overseas, um, and just being able to, you know, to-to survive that, you know, psychologically to wake up every day and to, you know, to continue with their lives.
Um, you know, it truly was, uh, just a, um, it truly one of the, um, you know, I-I think, one of the darkest stories I've-I've ever had to write.
THAROOR: Th-that's a great snapshot of the emotional and human drama that you can, you unfurl through the book.
So, I guess, the-the-the next question jumping off of what you just laid out, in terms of their experiences, the-the Uyghurs and the Kazakhs and other ethnic minorities of Shenzhen fraction of a fraction of the population in China, and what is the political logic to what China is doing from your analysis, I mean, why do they pose, why does their cultural difference, um, and why does their existence as it was, uh, pose such a kind of political and ideological threat to the Chinese state?
CAIN: The region that the Uyghurs live in, and the Kazakhs, um, was historically independent for a bunch of its history.
I mean, these, um, these are central Asian cultures that, you know, were either under the control of many other kingdoms or had their own, um, kingdoms at certain points, their own, uh, their own languages, their own sense of history, and-and culture of, and they never really, you know, I-I think as a group, um, did not, you know, swear fealty to, uh, you know, the Chinese state, as the Chinese state, you know, er, as the Chinese communists put-took over, but also before that, um, you know, when there were other dynasties and powers.
They-they were always kind of a distant empire, and even previous Chinese dynasties, you know, there are writings that historical writings that have been uncovered, they talk about how, you know, there's no point in trying to control this region too much, because, you know, the people, they're not that loyal and, you know, it's like they're, yeah, they're, it's too expensive, it's, you know, it, we-we have to send military resources and it's just, it's just not worth it.
Um, but, um, you know, today the stakes of change, uh, have changed a lot, you know, we live in a new geopolitical order that's been emerging, um, you know, in this post-Cold War world, and, you know, even shifting under our feet in the past few years, with these trade wars and, you know, the rise of China and Russia and other, uh, authoritarian regimes around the world, and, um, you know, the Uyghurs happen to be sitting on-on a very strategic spot, um, in this geopolitical order, so first of all it is the gateway... Xinjiang is the gateway to the, um, to many of the Belt Road projects, that is the determinus it, and the starting point.
Um, that is where, you know, China faces the West, uh, central Asia, um, you know, the-the Middle East, um, parts of Siberia, and Russia, and, you know, that is a region that the President Xi Jinping of China has wanted to, um, pacify throughout his reign over the past eight, nine years.
Um, he-he wants to pacify it, because he wants to build these infrastructure projects, and then on top of it, this is an oil-rich region.
It is energy rich, um, you know, rich in minerals, central Asia, as a whole, is also rich in rare earths.
Um, you know, a lot of these, uh, resources are used to, um, you know, to-to-to-to fuel many of the new technologies, the hardware in the smartphones, you know, the-the self-driving cars that are supposed to come out.
Um, these resources are deeply strategic for the world we live in, and so, you know, to have a pacified Xinjiang, and to have a region that is, you know, not just pacified, but completely loyal, completely stripped of any sense of political or cultural difference, and loyal to the Chinese state, is what China wants.
So, er, you know, I think that there has been, and it's not just what I think, this has been well-documented, there has been, uh, a very, uh, just a stern campaign by the Chinese state, um, since around 2013 and '14 to define the Uyghurs as an internal enemy that, you know, that it's-it's the other, you know, the internal enemy, as China rises, as President Xi Jinping, um, you know, creates this personality cult that, you know, is-is in some ways like a return to Chairman Mao back in the, in the cultural revolution, uh, you-you know, he needs an enemy, he needs, he needs a terrorist boogeyman inside his borders to consolidate power.
Um, so those are a lot of the, you know, kind of the big-picture social and political changes that have, um, fueled these crackdowns and fueled the rise of the camps, and-and the artificial intelligence, and the, um, you know, the-the surveillance states.
Just observing this situation from now, I'm now in Washington D.C. so I'm a little more distant from it, um, I personally don't think that, um, you know, President Xi's personality cult can continue in this way forever.
I mean, I do think that it is fundamentally unsustainable and, you know, as we've seen throughout the history of these regimes, personality cults do tend to consume themselves, um, pretty quickly, so, I, you know, I don't know if this surveillance state is going to continue forever, as it is now, but, um, you know, what is alarming is just that, you know, there are so many people in there, in these concentration camps, who, um, you know, who are suffering at the hands of the Chinese state, but when they get out, uh, you know, we just, we don't know if they get out, we just don't know, you know, what this region is gonna look like?
I mean, will-will this culture have simply been erased from the earth, like will the language simply have been, you know, erased?
Will it only be diaspora communities that are keeping it alive?
Like are, like are they gonna come out and simply be, you know, converted to pawn Chinese people essentially?
THAROOR: This narrative of ethnic cleansing is alarming, uh, because, er, er, it is really worth, uh, thinking about and talking about the depth and-and significance of Uyghur identity.
This is, you know, obviously in our imaginations, this-this-the Silk Road culture, it's, um, a population of people who live on peripheries of empires, and-and so on, but-but it really is, uh, um, I mean, I, the last time I was in Xinjiang was, you know, much longer, mu-much more, I think 2007, um, before smartphones, before the era of kinda, any kinda digital surveillance, um, and before a moment when Chinese authorities had already... the Chinese had yet to start their big campaign of bulldozing of old Kashgar, which is, uh, as Geoff said, the kind of symbolic, cultural heart of the Uyghur people.
Uh, and-and it-it-it's, I think it's really important to hammer home how-how unique and special a place Kashgar is.
At the time I had just been there, they had just filmed, um, uh, Khaled Hosseini's Kite Runner, the adaptation of that, because the city resembled the streets of old Kabul so much.
Uh, it was, uh, you know, the-the first dictionary of the Turkish language, uh, was written by Mahmud al-Kashgari, er, someone from Kashgar, and given to the Abbasid Caliph in Baghdad in the 13th, in the 13th century or 14th century, I forget, um, and-and so-so this is a place that really is-is central in so many ways to Turkic identity, to-to the story of the Silk Road, and-and as Geoff is saying the-the-the campaign that the Chinese have taken about, uh, or from what we know about it, is really sweeping and totalitarian in its nature and scale, in terms of what it's trying to reprogram about the Uyghurs and about the ethnic minority identities in Xinjiang.
Um, I suppose this is the moment to ask you, er, obviously the Chinese narrative about what's happening is very different to what you've reported, and to what we've been reporting, uh, in The Washington Post, in The New York Times, and elsewhere, could you talk a bit about, uh, first of all the dissonance between, uh, what we can say, what we know about what's happening in China, and what they let us see, first of all, and then of course their narrative is totally different, so I think it's-it's incumbent of us to try to present the Chinese view of things a little bit, which of course is heavily hinged around, uh, their view of security, and also their view of development in at-large.
CAIN: Yes, um, so the Chinese, um, narrative, you know, I, one-one of the things I find so fascinating about what's happening to the Uyghurs is that, um, you know, the Chinese and the Western or kind of, or Chinese and Five Eyes narrative, or the, you know, European Union and American narrative is just so, um, just completely divergent in-in every single way.
I mean, it's just, I mean, there-there is, you know, there are a set of facts laid out, and it's just such a great example as to how, um, you know, the-the filters that you have, and, you know, these can be internet filters, or-or they can be more, um, you know, government filters or-or speaking more, uh, you know, on a deeper level, kind of, um, you know, um, like kind of cultural and historical filters, you know, kind of building the narrative of the nation, and how the nation was constructed, how it can just lead to vastly divergent, uh, world views, even though, you know, there are certain facts that are undeniable.
Um, you know, so the-the Chinese narrative really comes down to, um, the-the feeling that, you know, its, so its coasts, its east coasts are, um, overexploited.
The Communist Party's view is that, you know, it's surrounded by, um, hostile powers historically, that have been backed by the US, so, you know, South Korea, uh, Japan, er, you know, it-it-it makes its claims to Taiwan, uh, you know, Hong Kong or the British-British colony, you know, the-the Opium War was where, um, a lot of, you know, a lot of this happened, where this, what they call the, uh, you know, the Century of National Humiliation happened, and-and there really is a deep-rooted, um, feeling, you know, in Chinese government narratives, and in propaganda of, you know, this sense that, "If we don't, um, you know, show our strength, uh, or if we don't, you know, standup, stand tall and, you know, er, uh, you know, militarily st-like military, in a military way, but also in a technological way competing, um, with US technologies, um, you know, then we are going to be encircled once again, and, you know, we're gonna be embarrassed and humiliated by foreign powers that are stronger than us, um, and we need to, you know, do what we can to, you know, carve out our space, to ensure that China-China and its surrounding, uh, territories are safe for China."
Um, so, you know, I'm not, I'm not speaking in any way to the, you know, the factual basis of-of these different narratives, but this is just, you know, what the party and, you know, the-the Chinese elite tell themselves when they make, um, you know, major foreign policy decisions.
So, you know, the-the Western part, Xinjiang and going, you know, west through Central Asia, that's traditionally a ground, um, you know, that, uh, you know, despite the-the war in Afghanistan and Iraq, and the American interventions there, it's still relatively open ground, um, for, uh, Chinese infrastructure investments, and for, you know, oil investments, and for, you know, some of the major, um, you know, resource gathering projects that fuel, you know, the Chinese boom that's been happening over the past, you know, 20, 30 years.
When the Chinese narrative looks at a place like Xinjiang, it's just, it's so problematic, um, for Chinese leaders, because, you know, they-they essentially look at it, and they see, they, you know, they see like this sense of, you know, "Xinjiang should be our dominion," you know, like this is, er, they-they say, you know, "This is, this is actually China," even though many Uyghurs would disagree, you know, they want independence and they say, you know, for, you know, "For this region to be, you know, to consider itself culturally separate, and to consider itself, um, you know, potentially politically separate from us is, you know, er, it's a threat, because it's the type of force that could break up China in the same way that the Soviet Union, um, fizzled and fell apart and, you know, many central Asian states had their own independence movements against the Soviet Union."
Um, you know, that's-that's the big fear of the Chinese authorities, and, you know, that's why, er, you know, I mean, it's, and I'm not justifying what's happened at all, but, um, these extreme measures that they're taking, they're essentially trying to do what they call, as, um, you know, you have to uproot all the weeds, uh, you know, to grow the crops.
You know, they-they see it as like a weed-killing campaign, or a pesticide campaign.
Um, they actually use this language, and it's very disturbing, and, uh, they, you know, they-they see it as, like, "If we can pacify the region, and just simply make the region Hong, then we don't have to like, you know, the-then we don't have to worry about, you know, all these other complicating, you know, political and geographic factors," you know, "just make it Hong Chinese, and then that will solve our problems," and that's why we see concentration camps and repression and surveillance, and it really is in many ways a, er, I see it as maybe a-a repeat, maybe a post-modern repeat...
I like that word that Ishaan used, a post-modern, um, atrocity, um, because it-it really is a repeat of, um, you know, what's happened, you know, in the 19th century, with, uh, European colonial powers, you know, with some of the slave labor that went on.
Um, you know, this sense of sort of, you know, this racial superiority that pumped up a lot of, you know, the-the colonial projects that happened in the past.
Um, you know, China is essentially now I-I think that we have to admit that China is behaving, um, like an old-school colonial power, and they've managed to find ways to, you know, adapt these, uh, new, novel technologies, like AI and facial recognition in particular, um, to, you know, to-to make that more of a 21st-century reality, instead of say a 19th-century reality.
THAROOR: So-so about the 21st-century nature of-of, you know, this-this perfect police state, as you, as you call it in the title, um, talk us through some of the technologies that we're seeing, some-some of the methods that are being pioneered by the Chinese, and-and, er, and your sense of how this can be, uh, replicated or transplanted in other contexts elsewhere?
CAIN: So, um, one of the, er, you know, I guess, oddly terrifying things about the Chi-about the Chinese tactics in Xinjiang and-and nationwide actually, um, is that in 2005 China started its, um, its surveil-its-its, what-what it's surveil-so it started its surveillance, its-it, um, I-I'm tr -I'm having trouble kind of, um, defining this, because it's not a single surveillance system, but this is like a-a collection of systems that have been pieced together over the years, and so th-this collection of systems was called Skynets, um, which is, you know, for those of you who have, who have seen "Terminator", um, you know, when you go to China, you're essentially being surveilled by the Skynet system.
Um, and, you know, I, you know, obviously I don't think there was a-a Chinese bureaucrat somewhere who was a "Terminator" fan and thought, "Hey, this is a great idea, lets, uh, name our surveillance system Skynet, and you know, repress the Uyghurs with that," um, you know, er, there's a Chinese context to that name that-that goes kind of deep, and I won't, I don't need to get into it here, um, but, you know, the-the irony of that name is just that it-it just defines just th-this foreboding, you know, this-this like menacing, foreboding, um, sense of how the-the surveillance system works.
Um, one of the Uyghurs who, you know, was very, uh, well-informed... someone who I actually interviewed, one of the only people who I actually could talk to in Xinjiang in 2017, um, as these crackdowns were happening, I-I had a very, very, um, worldly well-informed assistant who, um, told me about how what's happening in Xinjiang is a, uh, it's a panopticon.
Uh, and a panopticon, this is, uh, an idea that was created by the, uh, the British philosopher Jeremy-Jeremy Bentham, and it also has many echoes in George Orwell and, er, you know, a lot of the sci-fi dystopian novels from the past 50 years.
Um, and so the-the panopticon is this, uh, prison system in which, you know, it's a circular prison, and, um, on the, in the outer circle there are all the cells, and, you know, all the, so all the, um, all the people in the prison are-are, you know, in their cells that go in this circle, and in-in the center of the circle looking outwards at all the cells is a guard post, a century post, um, but it's constructed in a way so that, um, like nobody can actually see the guard, and what it does psychologically to people is that it makes them fear that they are, um, constantly being watched, but they don't know when or where, or how?
I mean, you just don't know like, "Is the guard standing at your side of the circle and looking at you directly, does he have a, um, you know, does he have a telescope, does he, you know, is he like holding up, uh, you know, some kind of audio device to listen in on-on your conversations with your fellow cellmates," like you just have no idea what is happening behind the veil, and it-it could even be, no one's there, I mean, it could just be an empty... it could be a Wizard of Oz scenario, where there's just this, you know, there's some pretender just, you know, dozing off whose not-not the real deal, who doesn't really care about surveillance, but that still terrifies people because they're so uncertain about whether or not they're being watched at any given moment.
Um, so this is the essence and nature of the Skynet system of China.
Um, I did find a lot of evidence in my reporting in both written documentation that I found, I-I did get a number of leaks in the process of this, and also my interviews with, um, some technology workers who had worked on this, you know, this-this surveillance system in Xinjiang, um, you know, they-they told me that actually behind the veil, the system was not all that sophisticated, that actually they didn't totally understand how it worked.
They were using crude algorithms, um, you know, they-they just had bad data at times.
I mean, they would, it's like they would gather so much data, that they-they had, nobody could figure out what data was worthwhile, and what was garbage, and nobody could really figure out like, "How does the AI system find a correlation, you know, between someone who, um, you know, like walks in the backdoor of their house and, you know, that means that they are gonna commit a terrorist crime in a week," like these are the-the kinds of correlations that the AI, that the AI would make for them.
You know, it's kind of like goofy that, uh, you know, that the AI would think that, but, you know, that's-that's the irony of this perfect police state.
You know, I-I find it just so ironic that, um, the perfect police state is perfect because of its imperfections, because it's not perfect.
Like I just think that if this system were actually perfect, then people would be able to figure out how it works, and they would, you know, find ways to, you know, not go to a concentration camp, but the nature of the Chinese system is that it's like this Kafka, you know, bureaucracy overload where it's just, you know, "Everyone is a potential terrorist, just arrest arbitrarily, um, send people to camps arbitrarily," and it terrifies people, and it-it terrifies them into snitching on other people, you know, making up stories, you know, "Get your neighbor sent to the camp, so you're not sent, you'll be more trustworthy that way."
Um, so it's like, it's a system that consumes itself, and, you know, it's consumed a lot of, um, Uyghur society in the process, so that-that's really, I would define, er, that's how I define the core of the Chinese, um, strategy in this region.
THAROOR: So, you, we have talked a bit about, uh, the-the nature of-er, of, um, the Western response, well we haven't really addressed it very much, but there is a question about  what scares you the most about China's relationship with the US, um, I would kind of tack on, uh, just a thought about, you know, where does Xinjiang fit into the US-China conversation?
Of course, we had the Trump administration, uh, take a number of significant steps, uh, mostly symbolic, er, er, heavily on rhetoric in terms of calling to attention what was happening in Xinjiang, framing it around the issue of religious liberty, it's you know, the most beloved, the most love word of the Trump administration was certainly Uyghurs.
Um, and-and so-so talk a bit about now where things stand, and-and-and where this particular story, what's happening to sh-the Uyghurs and the other ethnic minorities in Xinjiang fits into, you know, a-a broader and more complicated and-and pretty perilous situation right now, vis-à-vis US-China relations?
CAIN: Well, I think the most, um, complicating factor that I think, um, I-I think that it-it terri-it's-it's a potential that terrifies many, uh, American businesses, um, and I think it also directly impacts, you know, the, um, you know, the-the, I-I guess, the consciences of regular, you know, American buyers.
It's this problem of supply chains.
Um, so Xinjiang runs a massive... the government there runs a massive, um, forced labor program called Xinjiang Aid, which in its, in its usual Orwellian fashion, the government describes it as a project to, um, you know, to build, uh, you know, to give its vocational skills to the, to the detainees and to build prosperity by giving them these skills to build economic prosperity in the region, but really it's just a-a slave labor system, um, in which, uh, many of these Uyghur, um, people who have been taken to camps, they're forced to stitch away at garments and, you know, these are, uh, these are garments that have, er, you know, infected the supply chains of major, major, um, companies around, globally, you know, like major American companies, and also global companies, I mean, I think Uniqlo was one that was pretty badly hit.
The conundrum now is that, um, the supply chains are infected, but because China is-is such a black hole of information, um, I think a lot of people, a lot of businesses, in particular, and government regulators have been scrambling just to think, just to find anything they can to figure out, um, what supply chains are being infected by Uyghur slave labor, like, "What do we do to stop it," and it's just proving to be a nightmare, because it-it's this, you know, it's this ill effect of the, er, you know, the-the globalized system that we live in.
It's like we-we've created this system where the US and China, and other nations are so tethered together economically and through trade that, you know, if-if one side decides to put slaves, you know, in its supply chain, then it's like, you know, America can't easily find a way to first locate the slaves, and then figure out like how to divorce its supply chains from that, because, you know, supply chains are so complicated.
I mean, there are so many, um, components, you know, for electronics, for iPhones.
Apple actually dropped, um, one of its big suppliers in China because of these same concerns over Uyghur slave labor, uh, and it's just like, I mean, but-but its, this is just tip of the iceberg, and I, er, you know, my suspicion from my own research and many researchers also agree with this is that, um, the problem with slave labor goes far deeper, and is far broader, far more impactful than anyone can even realize.
I mean, there-there is, um, I mean, there's a chance that, uh, you know, like I, without-without knowing it, any of us, you know, me or anyone in this audience, you know, might have bought clothes, you know, from a regular Gap or somewhere that might have somewhere along the line kind of gone through these slave camps in Xinjiang, and its-it's a terrifying thought.
So I think that that's sort of the, um, I, for, I think that for, you know, just, you know, like Americans who are concerned about this issue, I think that's the most direct in your face, um, reason to be concerned.
Um, but then there are also, you know, many high ideals that we have to keep in mind, so there is, Ishaan as you said, the, um, the framing of religious liberty, that's been a-a very common one.
Um, you know, just general concerns over civil lib-liberties.
Um, but then also the-the big, I think the big question, and the big debate that's happening now is whether this amounts to genocide?
Um, there is, er, it's a raging debate that, so the US State Department says it's a genocide.
Um, a handful of parliaments in other countries, such as Canada, uh, have voted in favor of calling it a genocide, but I don't think that they're, um, that, yeah, I-I don't think this is being used by government agencies there yet.
Um, so under international law there are, you know, a number of criteria that would qualify, um, an atrocity as a genocide, and-and one of them is the forced sterilization of a population.
So, you know, uh, China carries out forced sterilization campaigns, uh, against Uyghur women, um, and you know, says on paper that this is an attempt to, you know, to-to cut birth rates, which would, you know, lead to more prosperity, and-and a better outcome, but in reality, um, you know, er, I-I just think, um, I mean, er, nobody really believes that anymore, and, you know, in-in reality and all probability, um, it's an attempt to exterminate, to-to drop the birthrate so low that simply the Uyghur people, um, either don't exist in the future, or they're just such a minuscule group that, um, you know, they're just they're in-they're insignificant in the, in the big Chinese picture.
THAROOR: There was another question in the chat specifically asking you what more people can do to-to help the Uyghurs and I think you-you more or less touched on that, what is also important to point out, and maybe you've some thoughts on this very quickly, is-is beyond the West and governments in Europe and the US and in Canada, uh, speaking out, there are countries much closer to China geographically and politically, uh, that are completely silent about the Uyghur issue, or-or have in some ways kind of compromised positions they would otherwise not ho-co-compromise themselves in certain ways.
The most glaring example is-is is Pakistani leader Imran Khan essentially apologizing for the Chinese, and-and covering up what's happening just across his border, even as he grandstands over the plight of Kashmiris on the other part of the border in India.
Uh, and then, where you were, in Turkey, uh, you know, this is, er, the spiritual home of-of, uh, you know, of the Turk-of the Turkic cause, and-and, but yet you have President Erdogan taking a very kind of mini-mouse approach.
Could you talk quickly about, uh, the extent to which the rest of the world also is kind of dropping the ball on-on making this a real issue, and building any kind of leverage over China?
CAIN: Well this is the, uh, this is the effect of-of-of China, and just having enormous, um, influence over global affairs, you know, in 2021 through these Belt Road programs, so, uh, eh, so Belt Road, for those of you haven't been following, it's a-a one-trillion planned, it's a planned one-trillion dollar, estimated one-trillion dollar, um, series of infrastructure, loosely-connected infrastructure projects around the world, ports, roads, um, bridges, the, you know, whole shebang dams, um, and, uh, you know, China has been accused of-of pressuring countries into massive amounts of debt to, you know, to get leverage over those countries, so, um, one of the things that's, you know, happening, that, you know, I, it's been happening for a few years now, is that many of these kind of middle-income countries, and lower-income countries, um, you know, in parts of Africa, in, uh, you know, South Asia, in the Middle East, you know, countries that really see... they see themselves benefiting from Chinese largeness they see themselves, um, you know, benefiting from all these-these aid programs, and these loans that China can give to them.
Um, you know, they don't wanna speak up against China.
I mean, why would, you know, why would they want to, uh, you know, risk that, you know, that-that money coming in?
Um, there-there have been a few cases where, um, some leaders ironically in majority Muslim countries have-have just outright deported the entire Uyghur population back to China, um, in exchange for Chinese help.
I think that the worst, um, the-the worst perpetrator so far has been Egypt.
Uh, Egypt in 2016 and '17 just essentially, um, you know, sign-signed a series of Chinese, uh, security deals and then throughout the summer that it was signed, just hunted down Uyghurs, um, you know, sent them back to almost, you know, er, it was almost certainty that they were put in concentration camps, so that is a tragedy.
THAROOR: You have two-two comments about your, uh, your statement about the unsustainable nature of-of what's in play in-in Xinjiang, or perhaps politically vis-à-vis, uh, the Xi Jinping, uh, regime, um, one question is, er, is his personally-personality cult, uh, unsustainable, who will come up to replace him?
Another question, uh, Dave Hazzen says, uh, "I met a Shanghai journalist in Kashgar in 2016 who told us, 'You have no idea what's going on here?'
Uh, but do you think strongmen cults really destroy themselves quickly?"
Again, same sort of question as that, so how sustainable are the politics behind what you're laying out in your book?
CAIN: So, I don't think that the politics are fundamentally sustainable, but there's that-that new factor of these new technologies that might make it more sustainable.
I mean, if you have an AI surveillance system that's watching everyone, um, you know, that might be the-the key, the Holy Grail that kinda keeps, you know, keeps the system working however twisted it is.
But, um, I, so I think that with President Xi, he is, um, you know, he's-he's, I-I don't know if he's has powerful as he, uh, gives off.
He has built this personality cult, um, but we've seen already that-that there is disconsent-discontent in the system, so you know, when I was reporting this, and other journalists reporting the Xinjiang story, there were a number of leaks that came out, uh, and these are official, you know, Communist Party bureaucracy leaks, just making their way out, you know, getting out on, sometimes on Twitter, on Facebook, just people posting documents, Uyghurs usually posting documents that they somehow managed to, you know, to get in this region.
Um, you know, that, like that doesn't happen in China, so traditionally,  and, you know, I'm sure Ishaan can relate to this, uh, China is just a, you know, is just a blackbox of information.
It's-it's very difficult to get behind the veil and see what's happening inside the Communist Party, and, you know, with its leaders, and the fact that people are leaking material to Uyghur activists, and foreign journalists, just says right there that clearly there is huge disconsent-there's huge discontent somewhere in this system.
Um, so this, it's just my conjecture, you know, I-I don't totally know if, you know, what's gonna happen to President Xi, but the fact that these leaks are happening... they-they suggest to me that, um, the-the leaks will continue to happen, um, and in-in the process that sort of dynamic will wear down at his grand personality cult that he's trying to keep, and someone asked also about who will replace him, so that's the thing, is that, you know, Chi-elite Chinese politics is just such a blackbox, you know, people can rise really suddenly, and just kind of appear out of the blue, um, at party congresses and-and be voted in, and it's not always clear who is gonna emerge, um, it's just, there's just not enough information to even speculate, I think.
THAROOR: Okay, so I think we have time for just one last question, it's from Louis Simons, he asks, "Geoff, how would you compare China's treatment of it's Uyghurs and other non high-mi high-minorities, like the Tibetans as it establishes its place on the world stage with that of, uh, the United States, and the way the United States treated Native Americans, at a similar period in its evolution?"
That's an interesting framing, uh, I don't know if you wanna take that up, but maybe this is a moment for you to respond to that, and offer us some closing thoughts?
CAIN: Uh, yes, so actually I-I do think that there are many parallels, um, you know, between manifest destiny and America and the expansion in the West and the clearing of Native American lands, um, to what's been happening to the Uyghurs.
I mean, I-I don't think that, I'm always careful about these historical comparisons because, um, you know, there-there is never a perfect parallel, or a perfect comparison, but I do think that many of the same dynamics, um, are at play, and, you know, I, no, you know, America has not been this, uh, angel throughout its history that, you know, simply, you know, treats everyone democratically and with respect.
You know, like we, there is a brutal history in America of-of slavery, um, and expansion, you know, that has really formed some significant parts of the system.
Um, so but I-I do wanna just clarify that, um, I'm always careful about, um, you know, drawing these comparisons between countries, because the reality is also that, you know, China, um, and, you know, other authoritarian regimes, North Korea, um, you know, they simply, you know, they simply come from different histories, different heritages, um, you know, different political cultures that have also evolved on their own, you know, over many, you know, centuries of-of interaction with other groups.
We also have to remember that America, you know, America is not a one-party state.
Um, you know, it looked like it might become one for a little while, but, you know, we-we have elected a new presidents, and there are a lot of these differences that I could point out, and, you know, I-I-I think its beyond the conversation here, but I mean, yes, there is, there are some parallels between these historical atrocities.
GRAHAM: Well, we are out of time.
Uh, great-great moderating Ishaan, and-and Geoff, um, congrats on a-a very timely and important book, and may you suc-succeed not only in further exposing the-the cruelties being visited on the Uyghurs, but also the sheer scope of their surveillance system that, uh, that China has brought to bear in this aw-awful repression.
Um, to everyone watching, thanks for tuning in.
From all of us here at Politics and Prose, stay well, and well-read.
ANNOUNCER: Books by tonight's authors are available at Politics and Prose bookstore locations, or online, at politics-prose.com.
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