JUDY WOODRUFF: Amid the
flurry of debate over
the report by Robert
Mueller and his team,

the special counsel was
clear on one main
point: The Russian
government interfered in

the 2016 presidential
election in sweeping
and systematic fashion.

But, yesterday,
President Trump's son-in-law,
White House adviser
Jared Kushner, dismissed

the seriousness of all that.

JARED KUSHNER,
Senior Presidential Adviser:
And, quite frankly,
the whole thing's just

a big distraction
for the country.

And you look at
what Russia did, buying some
Facebook ads to try
to sow dissent and do

it -- and it's a
terrible thing -- but I think
the investigations and
all of the speculation

that's happened for the
last two years has
had a much harsher
impact on our democracy

than a couple of Facebook ads.

JUDY WOODRUFF: In addition,
a New York Times
article today reports
that the Former Homeland

Security Secretary Kirstjen
Nielsen was discouraged
by the president's chief
of staff from discussing

security for the 2020
election in front of
Mr. Trump.

The White House denied
this after the story
was published.

But what about 2020?

What has been done,
and what more needs to
be done, to protect
the integrity of our next

election?

Juliette Kayyem previously
served in the U.S.
Department of Homeland Security.

And Thomas Rid is
a cybersecurity expert at
Johns Hopkins University
who has closely studied

Russian operations.

Welcome to the "NewsHour"
to both of you.

Welcome back.

Let me start
with you, Juliette Kayyem.

We hear Jared Kushner
saying it was just a
few Facebook ads, but we
see a much more serious

picture being portrayed,
painted in the Mueller
report.

What do we know, in
sum, about what the Russians
did in 2016?

JULIETTE KAYYEM, Former
Department of Homeland
Security Assistant Secretary:
So, we know

now that it started
earlier than we previously
thought, as early as
2014, and that it was

more systemic -- or
systematic and more targeted
than we had once known.

What I mean it
was systematic is that there
is a theory that
Russia just threw a bunch

of things at the
wall and something stuck.

And what we now
know is that, both through
the Republican primary
and then through the

general, that the
Russians had a sustained
and concerted effort
to utilize social media,

the advertisements, and
other networks to
perpetuate essentially lies
about other candidates

or to support, by
the end, one particular
candidate, Donald Trump.

This is outside
the hacking issue.

On the hacking issue,
the story is well-known,
and it's documented in
volume one, that those

-- the hacking that
was initiated and started
by Russia, desired
by Russia through WikiLeaks,

was then sort of
weaponized by the U.S. media
in terms of it
repeating what was stolen,

and then became a
storyline that by the end
Hillary Clinton had to defend.

JUDY WOODRUFF: And, Thomas
Rid, how much of
this was underlined or
in fact became new

information in
the Mueller report?

THOMAS RID, Johns
Hopkins School for Advanced
International Studies:
The Mueller report

in fact added very
little genuinely new details
to the story
of Russian interference that

wasn't already publicly known.

In fact, I'm a
little disappointed that we
didn't learn more about
the social media data

specifically that the
Mueller report cites.

They seem to rely
on publicly available data.

But there's an important
thing that I think
the Mueller report
is falling short on.

The Mueller report named
the IRA, the Internet
Research Agency, the
trolling and the social

media operation, first
and also that's where
the first
indictment was published.

But the leaking and
the hacking -- or, rather,
the hacking and then
the leaking of Democratic

files, especially John
Podesta's inbox, was
far more significant
than the social media

operation.

So we risk overstating
the effect of the social
media campaign.

JUDY WOODRUFF: But you're
saying we need to
pay attention to all of it.

Juliette Kayyem, what then
do we know about
what the Russians are
up to for 2020?

JULIETTE KAYYEM: Well,
you know, I believe
White Houses matter, and
I believe that a

White House that
is committed to stopping
a foreign campaign
against our democracy would

be relevant.

And so what we're
seeing, of course, is the
denials, the Giuliani
statement this weekend

that, you know, it's
OK to get this information
from the Russians.

So I don't want
to put that aside, because
I do think that matters.

But, on the tactical level,
you do see a lot
of effort being made
on the state and local

level through the
Department of Homeland Security
to protect elections
and the election process,

and then, of course,
the kind of training
and efforts that are
being done through campaigns,

the Democratic Party,
the Republican Party,
to protect their networks.

Some of that is
defense, you know, layered
security encryption.

But some of it also
has to be offense, which
is in this case
naming and shaming it.

We have to be
quite public
about when someone's
stuff has been
taken, say, e-mails.

And then the final
thing, which I mentioned
before, the media has
to start having some

standards by which
they will determine whether
things stolen, not
leaked, things stolen,

will be utilized by
them to amplify the sort
of criminal behavior
by a foreign entity.

JUDY WOODRUFF: That's a
message we need to
give very
serious consideration to.

Thomas Rid, what about for 2020?

What do you see coming
in 2020 that this country
has to be on guard against?

THOMAS RID: Important, I
would add to what
was just said that
we learned in 2016 that

some of the
leaks were messed with.

The very first
leak, for example, contained
a document that was
the Russian front account

said, classified, came
from Hillary Clinton's
server and the State Department.

All three statements
were lies, were just
not backed up by the evidence.

So we have to expect
-- and that's the historical
norm -- we
have to expect forgeries.

And don't trust the
leaks at face value.

Very important
message for journalists.

But I would highlight
a really serious risk
here.

The biggest risk is
a combination of two things.

It's a combination of
the president of the
United States, if
he is defeated, calling

the legitimacy of
the vote into question,
which he has
announced multiple times already

that he would be
doing so, and, in combination,
a Russian operation
that would provide some

sort of credible evidence
to this claim that
the system is rigged in
the heat of the moment

on election night and
the following days to
sow doubt and create
uncertainty in a very

fragile moment, and
thus endanger a peaceful
transition of power.

JUDY WOODRUFF: Juliette
Kayyem, just quickly,
I see you nodding.

What gives you --
what makes you believe that
that's a concern?

JULIETTE KAYYEM: Because
the Russians know
the playbook.

They know that the
White House is not essentially
stopping or forcefully
stopping the playbook.

And they will change.

And so one of
my biggest concerns coming from
the -- you know,
both the cyber and physical

security space is that
the Russians will utilize
cyberattacks to have
a physical impact on

the voting process.

So, in other words,
how do you win Michigan?

You depress
20,000 African-American votes
in Detroit, so, whether
they, you know, sort

of force traffic issues
or signals go out,
or there's a blackout.

And so there's what
we call the Internet of
things, that you
would have a cyberattack

that would
impact physical processes.

For me, that's my worry.

The Russians are
sophisticated enough to do
that.

And they will change
and modify, in light
of what we now
know because of the Mueller

report.

JUDY WOODRUFF: Thomas
Rid, that's alarming
to even think about that.

How can the U.S.
be on guard against some
or all of this?

THOMAS RID: One
important aspect of being
on guard is to
really look at the available

evidence of what is
happening in a very, very
sober and cool-headed way,
which, is of course,

very difficult because
this conversation is
so highly politicized.

But by overstating the
threat -- and we are
overstating the full
spectrum of Russian influence

operations in 2016
currently -- by exaggerating
the threats, we
are effectively making that

operation more successful
than it actually
was.

And we risk,
by overstating disinformation,
we risk
engaging in disinformation.

Now, of course, we still
have to be on guard
and protect systems,
and I support everything

that we heard here.

But I just think
it's really important to
be also aware of
this risk of overstating

the problem at the same time.

JUDY WOODRUFF: Being
clear-eyed and direct
about everything we hear
and what we say.

Thomas Rid, Juliette
Kayyem, we thank you
both.

We're going to
continue to follow this.

JULIETTE KAYYEM: Thank you.