JUDY WOODRUFF: And for more on
the potential impact of these
new sanctions, as well as the

broader U.S. and European
response to Russia's moves, Nick
Schifrin is back with two views.

NICK SCHIFRIN: Judy, thank you.

For additional perspective,
we turned to Stephen Hadley,

national security adviser during
the George W. Bush administration,

and Andrew Weiss, who served in the George
H.W. Bush and Clinton administrations

on the National Security
Council staff and the State
Department's Policy Planning Staff.

Welcome, both of you,
back to the "NewsHour."

So, we just heard from the
deputy Treasury secretary.

Andrew Weiss, let me start with you. Do
these Russian banks have exposure to the

U.S. financial system? And does
targeting Russian oligarchs and
sovereign debt have any impact?

ANDREW WEISS, Carnegie Endowment
for International Peace: Well,

let's talk about what Vladimir
Putin uses to fund his economy.

He sells raw materials on global
markets for dollars. So, every
day, Russia sells four million

barrels of oil. Oil right now
is fluctuating around $100 a
barrel. That is a remarkable

cash flow that Putin is able to
harness for whatever purpose.
And money is always fungible.

Since the crisis in 2014, the Russian
economy, broadly speaking, has taken

the reliance it once had on
foreign capital markets and
basically tossed it aside. So,

the Russian economy today is increasingly
cut off from the global economy,

and far less dependent on Western
capital markets to fund itself.

It is clear that putting
sanctions on well-connected people

in the Russian (AUDIO GAP) is
annoying and frustrating to them.

But, remember, there are very
hawkish figures around Vladimir
Putin who actually benefit.

The less Russia is globalized,
the less it's connected,
that gives them more control.

And so, if you think about who's
sitting in the war room right now

with Vladimir Putin, it's not people who
are thinking about their 401(k) accounts.

NICK SCHIFRIN:

Steve Hadley, let me get you
to respond to not only the U.S.
announcements of sanctions today,

but the German, the British
and the German announcements
largely coming at the same time.

STEPHEN HADLEY, Former U.S.
National Security Adviser:
Well, I think it's a good step.

I'm afraid my own view is that
it's not going to be enough
to deter Vladimir Putin.

He didn't bring 100,000 -- over
150,000 troops to the border of

Ukraine to settle for putting
peacekeepers in these two
breakaway provinces, if you will.

And I think how it's going to unfold is
something like this. He has said he's

recognized an area that is
broader than just the territory
occupied by his proxy forces,

but it includes territory occupied
by Ukrainian forces. And I
think it could go in two ways.

Russia either tells the Ukrainians to get
out of that territory who are protected by

Russian peacekeepers. Russian proxies move
on Ukrainian forces. And, at that point,

Ukraine will have to either
back down or choose to fight.
And if it chooses to fight,

that would be an excuse that
Putin could use to move these
150,000-plus forces into Ukraine.

That's the scenario I worry about.
And I don't think the sanctions today,

regrettably, will deter him from doing so.

NICK SCHIFRIN: So, Andrew Weiss, let me
ask you about those scenarios in a minute.

But let me just ask you first
about Germany. How significant
is it that Germany pulled,

frankly, one of the most
significant cards it has,

which is to essentially cancel
the Nord Stream 2 pipeline, the
German-Russian pipeline that was

suspended, but still could
have gone forward had they not
made that announcement today?

ANDREW WEISS: I think the
Western world really owes

German Chancellor Schroeder (sic)
a debt for taking this move today.

And it's really the most important
move of all the sanctions that
were announced. It's good to see

Western governments, including
the White House, moving swiftly
and responding to the outrageous

things that Vladimir Putin said
and did yesterday. So all of that's
welcome. They show that they can

move quickly. And, clearly,
we're only seeing a down payment
on a sanctions package that,

as the crisis gets worse, is going
to get broader and more far-reaching.

So the administration is looking to the
Germans to basically make sure that the

European Union comes in alongside
the United States. The United
States' sanctions, I think,

will be more far-reaching and more
significant than what European
partners are prepared to do.

But particularly when it comes
to Vladimir Putin's sense that
the Germans are the soft spot,

I think that that's been dispelled
today by what the Germans have done

by basically putting this pipeline
project on indefinite suspension.

NICK SCHIFRIN: Steve Hadley, let ask you
about that idea of further U.S. sanctions.

The U.S. is withholding some
sanctions, most notably, the idea of

export controls that would
cut off U.S. technology

that Russia needs. Is that the right thing
to do in order to try and deter Putin?

STEPHEN HADLEY: I think they
have got the right approach,

to have a portion of their ultimate
sanctions package now, hold something in

reserve if, as I fear, Putin
does something bigger in Ukraine.

I think the other thing, though,
they need to think about and
I'm sure are thinking about

of whether they should do further
reinforcements of our NATO allies
that now find themselves on

the front line with Russia and, again,
the pace and the nature of the kind of

supply that they are providing to
Ukraine for their military forces

to give them and put them in a position to
resist a more massive Russian incursion.

I'm sure the administration is
thinking about both of those things.

NICK SCHIFRIN: Andrew Weiss, the U.S. has
indicated that it's unlikely to sanction

Russian oil exports, those exports
that you brought up at the beginning,

that give Putin such an economic
cushion right now. Is that a mistake?

ANDREW WEISS: I don't think so.

The challenge here whenever you're
coming up with a sanctions regime is

to remember that you want to hurt the
other guy more than you hurt yourself.

And we heard Secretary Adeyemo
talk in those terms just now.

The challenge is, is that
the Russian economy is built
around a system where they

bring in their revenues in dollars,
and then their domestic liabilities
are denominated in rubles.

In 2014, Russia did not have a
free-floating exchange rate, and
they blew through some of their

currency reserves trying to defend
their currency. They're not going
to make that mistake, this time.

They basically have salted away
on the order of $630 billion in

various hard currencies to
deal with rainy day situations.

And they're not going to
basically use that to defend a
currency rate that isn't tenable.

What they will do, though, is, they will
tighten their belts. They will use their

receipts from selling various
commodities on global markets to

bolster the regime and to make sure
that the people who matter the most,

particularly people in the
military and the security
services, have what they need.

It's the average Russian consumer
who's going to be squeezed.
And they have done this in

previous cycles, where they
basically said to Joe Six-Pack
in Russia, sorry, you're going to

lose out. So Russians are getting
used to a crummy economic reality.
They have had multiple years of

declines in real incomes for
average people. And the Russian
government basically doesn't care.

So we're seeing that divide between
ruler and ruled widen in Russia. It

poses a long-term challenge
for Putin. But, at the moment,
there's nothing on the political

landscape that makes him uncomfortable or
makes him worried about his hold on power.

NICK SCHIFRIN: Steve Hadley, take
us back to those assessments that

you were laying at the beginning
and zoom out for us a little bit.

You have been in the national security
space since the mid-'70s. How dangerous

is this moment? How concerned
should we all be about some kind
of conflict in Ukraine spreading?

STEPHEN HADLEY: I think it's
a very dangerous moment.
And we should be concerned.

I think, if the Russians do
what we fear that they are going
to, do in terms of taking a

good chunk of Ukraine, recognizing
what they want to do is to
have a pro-Russian government

in Kyiv that will put Ukraine
under the Russians' sphere of
influence, and maybe except some kind

of confederation between Belarus,
Russia, and Ukraine, that's
really what Putin is about.

It's the restoration of the Russian
empire. If he moves in that direction,

the question is, what does it mean if you
are in the Baltic states, if you're in

Romania or you're in Bulgaria?
For example, one of the questions
that will be on the table is,

there is a portion, as you know, of Russia
that is disconnected from Russia. It is

separated from mother Russia, if
you will, by Poland and Lithuania.

And the question is, does Russia bulldoze
the corridor, to kayak up Kaliningrad,

with the rest of Russia? That -- it means
taking territory from the Baltic states,

from Poland. That invokes Article
5 of NATO. That invokes war.

So we have a serious situation in
Europe. And I would say, at the same

time we try to manage this deteriorating
situation in Europe, we have got the

challenge of China, and we also have the
challenge of Iran in the Middle East.

This is a huge agenda for America,
raising a real risk of overstretch.

And we're going to need a lot of friends
and allies and help from others if we're

going to manage what I think is going to
be a very challenging time going forward.

NICK SCHIFRIN: Stephen Hadley,
Andrew Weiss, thanks to you both.

STEPHEN HADLEY: Nice to be with you.